hose who have been following the “cost of gun control” series can go straight to the graph. For those who have not, the method used to demonstrate the relationship between violent crime and the restrictive gun laws is called may things, including “an embarrassment of coincidences; to demonstrate that a theory requirs an impossible number of coincidences. In the case of gun control, we have more than 57,000 failed gun controls, and more than 300,000 coincidences, two numbers that rule out the observed universal failure being by chance.
In Connecticut’s case, the chart starts with 1960 and only low 9.6 per 100,000 robbery rate and an equally low 21.6 aggravated assault rate.
When Hollywood began its gun ban campaign, those rates began heading up at a relatively rapid rate. By 1968 the robbery rate was to 45 per 100,000 population, while the aggravated assault rate was 73.7.
Five full years of Federal gun control later, the robbery rate was 84.2 while the aggravated assault rate was 11010.1 per 100,000.
These vilent crime rates continued to climb, with robbery peaking at 234.8 in 1990, and aggravated assault 286.0, both in 1990, during the Democrats “Assault Weapons Ban campaign.
Reported crime numers fell after the Assault Weapns Ban was signed into law, as Nutmeg State residents began to feel nothing would be done if they reported a criminal victimization and gun owners became afraid of their State government.
Robbery is represented by the blue trace, aggravaed assault by the red trace.
Counting the higher crime rates during and after gun control campaigns as well as the effects of restritive gun laws, there are 11 coincidences on one chart representing crime rates for only two crimes.
In itself, this is not sufficient to prove to six sigma confidence that gun controls result in increased crime rates, but with California’s failures that task becomes almost trivial.
Watch for the next two stops in the second part of this series, covering two of our smallest political subdivisions, the District of Columbia and Hawaii.